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SUMMARY: 
 ...  In the six years since Human Rights Watch and The Sentencing Project jointly released a report on felon 
disenfranchisement in the United States, some public and legislative attention has been focussed on the issue. ...  Part III 
discusses a recent Canadian decision which found that country's prisoner disenfranchisement law unconstitutional. ... 
The Canadian government had defended the ban on prisoner voting by asserting that disenfranchisement (1) enhances 
the general purposes of the criminal sanction and (2) promotes civic responsibility and respect for the rule of law. ...  
When the Supreme Court of Canada struck down a prisoner disenfranchisement law in Sauve, it paid particular attention 
to the constitutive function of voting, citing with approval the words of the South African Constitutional Court that "the 
vote of each and every citizen is a badge of dignity and of personhood. ... "Getting Out the (Prison) Vote": 
Implementing Prisoner Voting Rights A theme in the debate over prisoner voting rights in Canada is how to administer 
and facilitate prison votes so that the franchise might have some instrumental effect. Even where prisoners are permitted 
by law to vote, voter turnout remains low, as it is in those U.S. states allowing some prisoners to vote. ...   
 
TEXT: 
 [*73]  
I. Introduction 
  
 In the six years since Human Rights Watch and The Sentencing Project jointly released a report n1 on felon 
disenfranchisement n2 in the United States, some public and legislative attention has been focussed on the issue. n3 At a 
time when chronically low voter turnout n4 and racially-polarized voting n5 are harsh realities, the fact that state laws 
bar millions of American citizens from voting - in many cases, for life - is startling. The size and racial composition of 
the disenfranchised population indicate that these laws should be carefully scrutinized. Felon disenfranchisement laws 
bar more than 3.9 million people from voting, a disproportionate share of which are African American men. n6 
The practice of disenfranchising prisoners is neither limited to the United States, nor universal. Denmark, Israel, 
South Africa, Sweden and Switzerland are just some of the countries that place no restrictions on prisoners' right to 
vote. n7 Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom currently practice criminal disenfranchisement in a more limited 
way than the United States, n8 barring only certain offenders from voting, and only while incarcerated. 
Criminal disenfranchisement n9 has its roots in the punishment of "civil death,"  [*74]  imposed for criminal 
offences under Greek, Roman, Germanic and later Anglo-Saxon law. English law developed the related punishment of 
attainder which resulted in forfeiture of all property, inability to inherit or devise property, and loss of all civil rights. 
n10 These principles were transplanted to the British colonies which later became Canada and the United States. n11 
 Calls for reform of disenfranchisement laws in the United States focus primarily on the plight of individuals 
released from prison who are living in the community n12 as well as on the racial impact of felon disenfranchisement. 
n13 This paper challenges the dominant view in the United States that disenfranchising any prisoners is still sound 
public policy. A brief look north of the 49th parallel reveals that Canadian courts have recently confronted this question. 
In October 2002, the Supreme Court of Canada struck down as unconstitutional a federal ban on prisoner voting. n14 
This paper draws on the Canadian experience with a rights-based rejection of prisoner disenfranchisement in making the 
argument that the ballot box should be opened to all prisoners in the United States. 
Opponents of disenfranchisement often highlight the important symbolic or psychic impact of disenfranchising 
individuals in societies that purport to value universal adult suffrage, arguing that disenfranchisement brands or labels 
criminals as less than full persons who are unworthy of the franchise. n15 These arguments are  [*75]  powerful in the 
context of ex-felon disenfranchisement where the individuals in question have completed their punishment and, as such, 
have "paid their debt to society." The arguments for extending the vote to ex-felons are compelling and will not be 
repeated in detail here. n16 However, in taking up the important work of correcting this injustice, scholars and 
advocates have left largely unchallenged the law and policy that justifies disenfranchising the two million individuals 
n17 currently incarcerated in the United States. n18 In response to the highly symbolic and expressive arguments made 
for denying prisoners the vote (such as, for example, the justification that prisoners are morally unfit to exercise the 
franchise or that disenfranchisement expresses society's disapproval of criminal acts), opponents of disenfranchisement 
have cited the symbolic and psychic benefits prisoners receive by being included in the electorate. n19 
When it comes to considering the potential impact of extending the franchise to prisoners, advocates of prisoner 
voting rights tend to minimize the practical effect of these votes, stating that prisoner votes are unlikely to be 
statistically significant n20 and emphasizing that there is no evidence to indicate that prisoners (or  [*76]  even ex-
prisoners) will hold views different from the "mainstream" on criminal justice issues. n21 
Yet criminal disenfranchisement affects not only the individuals who are disenfranchised and effectively rendered 
second-class citizens. It affects us all because voting is not just symbolic. It has an instrumental function; it is the 
primary means by which individuals and groups express their preferences and alter law and policy. 
This instrumental n22 function of voting often figures prominently in the justifications for disenfranchising 
incarcerated prisoners when it is suggested that prisoners will vote as a bloc for lenient criminal law policies, will vote 
against the "public interest," n23 and will swamp the votes of law-abiding citizens living near prisons, particularly 
where prisons are located in small, rural communities. 
This paper takes seriously the objection that allowing prisoners to vote may have an impact on the outcome of 
elections or on the development of law and policy, given the extraordinarily high incarceration rate currently a reality in 
the United States. The reality that prisoners may have an impact on the outcome of elections is an argument in favour of 
allowing them to vote rather than against it. A progressive critique or constitutional challenge of prisoner 
disenfranchisement should call attention to the instrumental, as well as symbolic and constitutive functions of voting, 
and must defend the importance of having the views and preferences of prisoners voiced at the ballot box. This paper 
attempts to do that. 
Part II briefly surveys felon disenfranchisement laws in the United States. Part III discusses a recent Canadian 
decision which found that country's prisoner disenfranchisement law unconstitutional. The Canadian experience is 
instructive for its attention to, and ultimate rejection of, a number of common justifications for maintaining prisoner 
disenfranchisement laws. To understand the harm of prisoner disenfranchisement, Part IV examines three elements of 
the right to vote in American law (participation, aggregation and governance), as well as two distinct functions of the 
right to vote, namely the constitutive function and the instrumental function. Part V provides an analysis of the various 
constitutive and instrumental reasons for recognizing the right of prisoners to participate in the electoral process. Part VI 
offers some potential answers to the practical and administrative objections often cited by opponents of prisoner voting, 
drawing on the Canadian experience, and Part VII concludes with some thoughts on the prospects for change. 
 [*77]  
II. Voteless Millions: The State(s) of Disenfranchisement in the United States 
  
 The sheer number of individuals who cannot vote due to criminal disenfranchisement laws points to the need to think 
seriously and critically about the practice. Fellner and Mauer report that approximately 3.9 million American citizens 
are disenfranchised, 1.4 million of them permanently, as a result of state felon disenfranchisement laws. n24 In forty-
 eight states and the District of Columbia, criminal disenfranchisement laws deny the vote to all convicted adult felons in 
prison. n25 A majority of states extend disenfranchisement to include ex-prisoners on probation, n26 on parole, n27 or 
even permanently, n28 long past the time when offenders have "paid their debt to society." Department of Justice 
officials have called the aggregate of felon and ex-felon disenfranchisement laws across the states a national 
"crazyquilt" of differing standards. n29 
The statistics are even more disturbing when one looks at the racial composition of the disenfranchised population. 
Thirty-six percent of that population consists of African American men; in ten states, at least one in five African 
American men is disenfranchised, n30 and in seven of those states, n31 at least one in four African American men is 
disenfranchised for life. n32 There is also increasing attention to the web of other "collateral consequences" of criminal 
conviction, n33 such as disqualification from welfare benefits, public housing, and employment opportunities, that 
combine with felon disenfranchisement to relegate poor and racialized individuals, families and communities to a 
degraded form of citizenship and public participation. 
As a matter of constitutional law, the United States Supreme Court has said that felon disenfranchisement laws do 
not violate the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments, so long as they were not enacted purposefully to deprive racial 
minorities of the right to vote. n34 In fact, the Supreme Court held in Richardson v.  [*78]  Ramirez n35 that felon 
disenfranchisement is "affirmatively sanctioned" by Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment which provides, inter alia: 
  
When the right to vote ... is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such state, being twenty-one years of age, and 
citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of 
representation therein shall be reduced in proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole 
number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such state. n36 
  
 The majority's reasoning is not particularly convincing. In fact, Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment was rendered 
largely superfluous by the Fifteenth Amendment and the Supreme Court noted as much in Reynolds v. Sims, n37 when 
it essentially "read out" the section from the Fifteenth Amendment, relying only on the Equal Protection Clause in 
Section 1. In any event, as Justice Thurgood Marshall observed in dissent in Richardson: 
  
By providing a special remedy for disenfranchisement of a particular class of voters in 2, Congress did not approve of 
all election discrimination to which the 2 remedy was applicable, and such discriminations thus are not forever 
immunized from evolving standards of equal protection scrutiny. n38 
  
 Regaining the vote for former prisoners, let alone prisoners currently serving sentences, is sure to be an uphill battle - 
whether fought in the courts or legislatures - given the state of popular opinion and political discourse on criminal  [*79]  
justice issues n39 and in light of the sheer number of different state laws. Nevertheless, the moderate publicity 
associated with the Losing the Vote study in 1998 led to a flurry of reform initiatives in state legislatures, in Congress 
and in the courts. n40 However, none of these reforms aims to abolish disenfranchisement for incarcerated prisoners. 
n41 
III. A Look North: The Rejection of Prisoner Disenfranchisement in Canada 
  
 The United States and Canada share a common law heritage, a liberal democratic political culture, and a commitment 
to universal adult suffrage, all of which make the comparison of criminal disenfranchisement laws potentially useful. 
n42 In addition, while Canada incarcerates 102 adults per 100,000, much fewer than the U.S. rate of 686 per 100,000, 
n43 Canada tends to be more "tough on  [*80]  crime" than most European countries. n44 
The twenty year-old Charter of Rights and Freedoms n45 has provided grounds for a number of recent, high-profile 
challenges to prisoner disenfranchisement laws. The interpretive framework for Charter claims adopted by the Supreme 
Court of Canada requires the government to articulate clearly its objectives for infringing a right and to prove that the 
infringement is rationally connected to the objective and is the least restrictive means for achieving that objective. n46 
As a result, Canadian courts have subjected the normative arguments for prisoner disenfranchisement to close scrutiny 
in a way that has not occurred in American felon disenfranchisement cases. 
Section 3 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides that "every citizen of Canada has the right to 
vote in an election of members of the House of Commons or of a legislative assembly and to be qualified for 
membership therein." Claiming a violation of that right, Richard Sauve, a prisoner serving a life sentence for murder, 
challenged a provision of the Canada Elections Act n47 barring prisoners serving sentences of two years or more from 
 voting in federal elections. n48  [*81]  In a strongly-worded decision, a majority of Canada's highest court held that 
prisoner disenfranchisement laws, even those limited to longer-serving prisoners, unjustifiably infringe the right to vote, 
a right that is "fundamental to our democracy and the rule of law and cannot be lightly set aside." n49 
The Canadian government had defended the ban on prisoner voting by asserting that disenfranchisement (1) 
enhances the general purposes of the criminal sanction and (2) promotes civic responsibility and respect for the rule of 
law. n50 This position was a change from earlier prisoner voting rights litigation in which the government had 
unsuccessfully defended a broader, blanket ban on all prisoner voting on the basis that excluding prisoners promoted a 
"decent and responsible electorate." n51 That argument, based on the moral character of voters, was rejected as 
anachronistic and inconsistent with the values in the Charter. n52 
The majority in the recent Sauve decision viewed the new objectives of enhancing punishment and promoting civic 
responsibility as too symbolic and abstract to justify overriding a right as important as voting. n53 Chief Justice 
McLachlin noted that "the government has failed to identify particular problems that require denying the right to vote," 
n54 expressing concern that, "if Parliament can infringe a crucial right such as the right to vote simply by offering 
symbolic and abstract reasons, judicial review becomes vacuously constrained or reduced to a contest of "our symbols 
are better than your symbols.'" n55 
The government's evidence at trial consisted of the testimony of six expert  [*82]  witnesses, n56 a number of them 
American, who testified about the moral and philosophical justifications for prisoner disenfranchisement laws. These 
witnesses sought to relate their evidence to the two objectives of disenfranchisement advanced by the government: 
promoting civic responsibility and enhancing the criminal sanction. 
To support the objective of enhancing the criminal sanction, the government experts testified that the sentencing 
principles of retribution and moral education were served by disenfranchising prisoners. Under a theory of retribution, 
punishment is meant to "negate the wrong" committed by the offender. While nothing can literally negate a wrong, the 
act of punishing is an attempt to express something about the crime and to express society's condemnation of the 
criminal's act. n57 Jean Hampton - a moral philosopher and the key government witness whose evidence the trial judge, 
appellate court, and Supreme Court dissent found persuasive - testified that, in committing a serious crime, an offender 
asserts a feeling of power or mastery over a victim. Therefore, the law must assert something in response. 
Through the imposition of disenfranchisement as additional punishment, Hampton imagines the victim of crime 
and the community to be symbolically expressing to a criminal that they will not tolerate the violation of trust and 
societal values that the criminal conduct represents. Therefore, as part of the criminal's punishment, he or she will not be 
entitled to participate in the decision-making process which is committed to those values. n58 Hampton suggests that 
this process "morally educates" the offender. n59 
The arguments for retribution and moral education rely heavily on the expressive power of disenfranchisement. The 
majority in Sauve agreed that disenfranchisement sent a message, but not a positive one: 
 [*83]  
  
Denying citizen law-breakers the right to vote sends the message that those who commit serious breaches are no longer 
valued members of the community, but instead are temporary outcasts from our system of rights and democracy. More 
profoundly, it sends the unacceptable message that democratic values are less important than punitive measures 
ostensibly designed to promote order. n60 
  
 On the broader question of whether disenfranchisement is a constitutionally permissible form of punishment, the Chief 
Justice said, 
  
The argument, stripped of its rhetoric, proposes that it is open to Parliament to add a new tool to its arsenal of punitive 
implements - denial of constitutional rights. I find this notion problematic. I do not doubt that Parliament may limit 
constitutional rights in the name of punishment, provided it can justify that limitation. But it is another thing to say that 
a particular class of people for a particular period of time will completely lose a particular constitutional right. That is 
tantamount to saying that the affected class is outside the full protection of the Charter. n61 
  
 In advancing the second purported objective, promoting civic responsibility and respect for the rule of law, two of the 
government's witnesses advanced theories that criminal behaviour indicated disrespect for the welfare of fellow 
members of society, for the rule of law, and for the electoral process. n62 They then reasoned back from that 
 proposition to conclude that denying the vote to people who have committed serious crimes makes the franchise seem 
more valuable both to those prisoners and to the general public, and promotes the virtues of responsible citizenship. n63 
Again, the Supreme Court majority disagreed, saying that the government understood the connection between 
obeying the law and having a voice in making the law "exactly backwards." n64 The right of all citizens to vote is the 
basis of democratic legitimacy. n65 Therefore, when the state disenfranchises a group of citizens, it undermines its 
ability to function as the legitimate representative of those citizens. n66 In doing, so, it "erodes the basis of its right to 
convict and punish law-breakers." n67 
 [*84]  In any event, the government's assumption that civic responsibility is best promoted by excluding prisoners 
from opportunities for civic engagement was contradicted by Richard Sauve's own experience in prison. While 
incarcerated, Sauve pursued two university degrees and volunteered with charities and prison organizations n68 that 
mirror classic "civic associations." n69 A jury of local citizens and the correctional system itself rewarded Sauve for his 
high level of civic engagement by granting his application for an early parole hearing and then granting him parole ten 
years before he would normally be eligible, at least in part on the basis of his clean prison record and community 
involvement. n70 As noted by the majority in Sauve, "to deny prisoners the right to vote is to lose an important means 
of teaching them democratic values and social responsibility." n71 
The impact of Sauve will extend beyond the federal law found unconstitutional. The fact that this was the second 
time the Supreme Court of Canada had rejected a prisoner's voting rights claim, n72 combined with the strong language 
used to denounce government's purported objectives, makes it unlikely that any prisoner voting ban will pass 
constitutional muster, n73 including a number of provincial disenfranchisement laws. n74 The decision could also be 
persuasive in any future litigation over prisoner voting rights in countries with similar  [*85]  constitutional guarantees. 
n75 
To assess whether anything can be learned from the Canadian experience, n76 it is necessary to consider how 
American law defines the "right to vote" and, in particular, whether incarcerated persons are (or should be) included in 
the class of people who hold that right to vote. 
IV. The Right to Vote: Elements and Functions 
A. The Elements of Voting: Participation, Aggregation and Governance 
  
 The starting point for understanding the right to vote is the United States Constitution. The Constitution does not 
contain an express "right to vote," n77 nor does it require elections to be held or set qualifications for voters. n78 
Instead, it prohibits discrimination in allocation of the franchise based on race n79 sex, n80 and, to a limited degree, 
age. n81 Therefore, while the right to vote is not expressly guaranteed, once governments decide to hold elections, adult 
citizens are understood to have a right to participate equally with other adult citizens in those elections. Furthermore, the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly spoken of a right to  [*86]  vote, calling it "fundamental" n82 and saying that "no right is 
more precious in a free country." n83 
Pamela Karlan n84 has identified three strands of voting rights jurisprudence which indicate that the right to vote 
includes three interrelated but distinct elements: n85 participation, aggregation, and governance. n86 "Participation" is 
another word for enfranchisement and simply entails the right to cast a ballot that is counted in an election. n87 The 
element of "aggregation" recognizes that voting functions primarily combine individual preferences to reach a collective 
decision, usually the selection of one or more representatives. n88 Finally, the concept of "governance" understands 
voting as an integral part of the practice and process of decision-making through elected representatives, seeing voting 
as part of an ongoing public policy conversation rather than a declaratory event on election day. n89 
Over the years, the right to participate has grounded successful challenges to various restrictions on the franchise 
based on race, sex, literacy, wealth, mental competence, residency or moral character. Since voting was characterized as 
a fundamental interest by the Supreme Court in the mid 1960s, n90 limitations on voting participation have had to pass 
strict scrutiny review. n91 Karlan suggests that the Court's jurisprudence on voter participation embodies a value of 
"civic inclusion," meaning "a sense of connectedness to the community and of equal political dignity; greater readiness 
to acquiesce in governmental decisions and hence broader consent and legitimacy." n92 
The right to participate is understood to be "outcome-independent" in the sense that courts have not usually 
inquired into whether disenfranchised persons (such as African Americans, short-term residents or illiterate people) are 
likely to vote differently than the currently enfranchised population or whether broadening  [*87]  the franchise will 
affect the outcome of elections. n93 Conversely, the right of aggregation is essentially "outcome-regarding" because it 
 is based on the idea that groups of voters must have a fair opportunity to elect their representatives of choice. n94 A 
claim for prisoner voting rights is usually seen as implicating only the participatory element of voting, n95 yet the 
justifications for denying the vote to prisoners have not been content-neutral or outcome-independent. A prisoner voting 
rights claim must address the (often unarticulated) concern that prisoners' votes will swamp those of "law-abiding" 
citizens and must take seriously the possibility that prisoners may have policy preferences different from other groups in 
society. n96 Given the sheer number of incarcerated people in the United States, n97 their votes are not likely to be 
without impact. n98 
B. The Functions of Voting: Instrumental and Constitutive 
  
 Leaving aside the rights of aggregation and governance, the participatory component of the franchise can be understood 
to have more than one function. At a basic level, participation in the act of voting on election day is the primary means 
by which individuals express their preferences and views about the way they wish their society to be ordered and 
governed. It is the means by which individuals (and, through aggregation, groups) express their "political will" and 
direct governmental institutions. This instrumental concept of voting is generally content-neutral in the sense that it 
purports not to allow individuals to be disenfranchised because of the presumed content of their votes. n99 Voting is a 
means to gauge the political will,  [*88]  whatever the content of that will. 
However, recalling Karlan's concept of "civic inclusion," a competing theory emphasizes the constitutive function 
of voting. Disenfranchisement has been a powerful symbolic, as well as practical, method of excluding many groups 
such as women and minority racial and religious groups. Therefore, disenfranchised individuals may seek the vote to 
take part in a "meaningful participatory act through which individuals create and affirm their membership in the 
community and thereby transform their identities both as individuals and as part of a greater collectivity." n100 
1. Voting as Instrumental 
  
 When the United States Supreme Court describes the right to vote as fundamental and as "preservative of all other 
rights," n101 it draws on liberal theory which ascribes particular importance to political rights. n102 The franchise 
serves a gate-keeping function to allow a person to have some influence on the laws that govern him or her. n103 John 
Rawls' first principle of "justice as fairness" is that each person must have an equal right to the most extensive system of 
basic liberties. n104 Political liberties are fundamental to ensuring access to the political process which determines other 
basic liberties. n105 
This concept of the franchise figured prominently in the struggle for voting rights for African American people in 
the civil rights movement of the 1950s, 60s and 70s. While there was an important symbolic effect of including 
previously disenfranchised individuals in the electorate, the push for voting rights for African Americans was not 
merely a symbolic matter. Lani Guinier notes the extent to which the African American voting rights movement in the 
1950s and 60s was centered on a vision of Black political empowerment and based on a redistributive theory of 
"representation and the right to participate." n106 Guinier calls the idea that voting rights were the key to African 
American economic, political and social success the "Black Electoral Success Theory." n107 Under this theory, three 
reasons were articulated for political participation: (1) to mobilize the African American community; (2) to promote a 
social and economic agenda; and (3) to elect responsive officials. n108 Martin Luther King, Jr. described voting rights 
in similar terms when he said, 
 [*89]  
  
Give us the ballot, and we will no longer have to worry the federal government about our basic rights ... Give us the 
ballot and we will fill our legislative halls with men of goodwill ... Give us the ballot and we will help bring this nation 
to a new society based on justice and dedicated to peace. n109 
  
 Unfortunately, the history of African American voting rights struggles reveals that "Black Electoral Success" was a 
more elusive goal, one that would not be achieved by a campaign for formal participation in the electoral process alone. 
Therefore, current minority voting rights litigation and lobbying tends to focus on the rights of aggregation and 
governance, in the sense of making the votes cast by African Americans "count." However, with forty-five percent of 
the U.S. prison population being African American n110 and thirteen percent of all African American men being barred 
from voting due to felon disenfranchisement laws, n111 the loss of participatory rights has significant impact on the 
instrumental value of African American votes. 
 Implicit in an instrumental concept of the franchise is the idea that government functions best when the views and 
preferences of all its constituents are taken into account. However, the way one defines "membership" often justifies 
barring certain persons from the franchise, even those who may have sufficient interest and capacity to exercise an 
instrumentally useful vote. American states limit their membership for electoral purposes by using some citizenship, 
residency, age, and mental capacity requirements for voters. 
Residency requirements are perhaps the easiest to justify in the sense that membership in a community usually 
implies a physical connection to that community. n112 Non-residents can have an interest (such as a property interest) 
in a political community, but it is usually accepted that some form of residency requirement is necessary to define a 
political unit (particularly in a federal system where political units are self-governing), n113 although residency 
requirements must not be too broad. n114 
On the surface, age and mental capacity thresholds also seem appropriate, although the precise location of those 
thresholds is not obvious. It is likely that  [*90]  many teenagers, and probably some younger children, understand as 
much about voting as many adults and are considerably more informed than many adult voters. Any line will be 
arbitrary and it is beyond the scope of this paper to consider whether the age of eighteen is an appropriate line. n115 
With respect to mental capacity, it may be that the very few individuals who cannot understand that the act of marking 
an "X" on a ballot is the act of "voting" for a representative, do not have a strong claim to exercise that right. However, 
beyond that point, line-drawing will be problematic and potentially over-inclusive. Courts should require that mental 
competency requirements be minimal. n116 
Citizenship requirements, like criminal disenfranchisement laws, are problematic because they are not based on 
concerns about lack of capacity or interest. n117 At the local level, it is difficult to justify limiting the vote to citizens 
other than as a means to encourage immigrants to become citizens. The argument for alien suffrage is often made, at 
least in part, on the ground that equal obligations (i.e., the payment of taxes) should entail equal privileges (i.e., the right 
to vote for the people who will spend those tax dollars). In cities with large immigrant populations, such as Los 
Angeles, extending the franchise to non-citizens could have a discernable effect on electoral outcomes and on policy 
choices. n118 Limiting the franchise to citizens may also contribute to a sense of exclusion among minority  [*91]  
groups. n119 
The exclusion experienced by disenfranchised groups - historically in the case of African Americans, other 
minority groups, and women, and currently in the case of non-citizens, prisoners and ex-prisoners - leads many to the 
conclusion that voting serves more than just an instrumental function. It also serves a constitutive function. 
2. Voting as Constitutive 
  
 Something other than a desire to inform the government of their individual policy choices likely motivated Black South 
Africans to queue for hours and days in order to vote in the first post-Apartheid elections in 1994. When individuals 
have been disenfranchised, the act of voting takes on significance beyond its instrumental function. In discussing the 
historical meaning of citizenship in the U.S. context, Judith Shklar n120 suggests that for the disenfranchised and the 
newly-enfranchised, gaining the right to vote was and is about belonging and standing as a member of society. n121 
John Rawls also speaks of the "fundamental importance of self-respect" which is "rooted in our self-confidence as a 
fully cooperating member of society capable of pursuing a worthwhile conception of the good." n122 That self-
confidence arises from our status of equal citizenship which is guaranteed by the fair value of the political liberties. 
n123 In this way, the right to vote is fundamental not just in the pragmatic sense of enabling citizens to secure other 
rights, but also for its symbolic value. 
 [*92]  
V. Making the Case for Prisoner Voting Rights: Constitutive and Instrumental Reasons 
A. The Constitutive Effect of Enfranchising Prisoners 
  
 Calls to extend the franchise to ex-felons in the United States and to incarcerated prisoners in Canada have appealed 
strongly to the constitutive function of the franchise, particularly the notion that disenfranchisement profoundly affects a 
person's dignity and relegates him or her to the status of second-class citizen or even sub-human. When the Supreme 
Court of Canada struck down a prisoner disenfranchisement law in Sauve, it paid particular attention to the constitutive 
function of voting, citing with approval the words of the South African Constitutional Court that "the vote of each and 
every citizen is a badge of dignity and of personhood. Quite literally, it says that every person counts." n124 
 In making the case for a Voting Rights Act claim against criminal disenfranchisement laws, Andrew Shapiro notes 
that "the symbolic worth of enfranchisement should not be underestimated," n125 because it is a marker of citizenship 
and participation with other members of society. George Fletcher has argued that criminal disenfranchisement should be 
abandoned because it operates in the United States as a "technique for reinforcing the branding of felons as the 
untouchable class of American society." n126 Joe Loya, a disenfranchised ex-felon living in California, describes the 
relationship between the franchise, citizenship and personhood in similar terms: 
  
Without a vote, a voice, I am a ghost inhabiting a citizen's space... . I want to walk calmly into a polling place with other 
citizens, to carry my placid ballot into the booth, check off my choices, then drop my conscience in the common box. 
n127 
  
 To many of its critics, the biggest wound inflicted by criminal disenfranchisement is the symbolic exclusion and 
branding of offenders as unworthy members of society. The instrumental effect of prisoners' votes is minimized. The 
suggestion that prisoners might have views and preferences different from other voters is considered unlikely or, at 
least, not discussed as a factor in favour of extending the franchise to prisoners. n128 
Yet concerns about the way that prisoners might vote play a role in the debate over disenfranchisement. One of the 
commonly-invoked justifications for disenfranchisement laws is some variant of the theme that prisoners will vote  
[*93]  against the public interest, particularly on criminal law issues. In a 1967 felon disenfranchisement case, Green v. 
Board of Elections, n129 Judge Friendly endorsed this view, apparently finding it self-evident: 
  
It can scarcely be deemed unreasonable for a state to decide that perpetrators of serious crimes shall not take part in 
electing legislators who make the laws, the executives who enforce these, the prosecutors who must try them for further 
violations, or the judges who are to consider their cases. This is especially so when account is taken of the heavy 
incidence of recidivism and the prevalence of organized crime. A contention that the equal protection clause requires 
New York to allow convicted mafiosi to vote for district attorneys or judges would not only be without merit but as 
obviously so as anything can be. n130 
  
 George Fletcher labels these ideas "mystical" and "fanciful" and takes the view that they cannot "withstand a minute of 
rational argument." n131 Fletcher and the court in Green had in mind ex-felons who were living in the community, 
rather than current prisoners. However, in relation to prisoners' votes, the argument carries considerable force with, for 
example, the residents of a rural community who live next to one or more large correctional facilities. n132 
Even where prisoner voting is allowed, concerns about how prisoners might vote appear to lie behind rules that 
determine the electoral districts in which inmate votes are counted. n133 For example, in the Canadian jurisdictions 
where prisoners vote, laws usually deem a prisoner's ordinary residence or domicile to be his or her place of pre-
incarceration residence. n134 
B. The Instrumental Effect of Enfranchising Prisoners 
  
 Upon examination, the argument that prisoners' votes will be "subversive" can be turned on its head in favour of a 
robust instrumental view of the right to vote. Criminal law, like other aspects of public policy, varies over time and is 
continually undergoing a process of re-evaluation and revision as public attitudes change and are expressed by the 
voting public. Examples abound. At various times over the past hundred years, the legal treatment of such practices as 
abortion, drug use and sale, possession of alcohol, homosexual sex, and certain forms of sexual assault have shifted 
from being criminal to non-criminal or vice verse as public attitudes change. 
While it is not the case that voting is the only way that reformers can advocate  [*94]  changes to criminal or other 
laws, our democratic system is built on the premise that change is best effected through the electoral and legislative 
process, rather than through rebellion, rioting, or back-room influence. John Hart Ely speaks of the problem of the 
political "ins" excluding and deciding the fate of the political "outs," n135 a process which hinders social and political 
evolution. Ely goes on to say that we "cannot trust the ins to decide who stays out, and it is therefore incumbent on the 
courts to ensure not only that no one is denied the vote for no reason, but also that where there is a reason (as there will 
be) it had better be a convincing one." n136 
It is for this reason that political rights are often considered "preferred rights" that form the foundation for other 
rights. For example, in Canada, the right to vote in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was deliberately 
placed outside of the potential application of Section 33, the so-called "legislative override" provision. Section 33 
 permits the federal or provincial governments to declare that a particular law operates notwithstanding the existence of a 
Charter right that would normally render the law unconstitutional. n137 Rights such as freedom of expression, freedom 
of association and equality, are subject to a potential legislative override, n138 but political rights were meant to exist 
independent of changing public moods. n139 
Justice Marshall suggested in dissent in Richardson v. Ramirez that the real purpose of ex-felon disenfranchisement 
was a less than convincing one, namely "to keep former felons from voting because their likely voting pattern might be 
subversive to the interests of an orderly society." n140 In rejecting that rationale, Justice Marshall emphasized the need 
to treat the participatory right to vote as content-neutral, and his discussion in this regard is worth quoting at length: 
  
The process of democracy is one of change. Our laws are not frozen into immutable form, they are constantly in the 
process of revision in response to the needs of a changing society. The public interest, as conceived by the majority of 
the voting public, is constantly undergoing reexamination. This Court's holding in Davis, supra, and Murphy, supra, that 
a State may disenfranchise a class of voters to "withdraw all political influence from those who are practically hostile" 
to the existing order,  [*95]  strikes at the very heart of the democratic process. A temporal majority could use such a 
power to preserve inviolate its view of the social order simply by disenfranchising those with different views. Voters 
who opposed the repeal of prohibition could have disenfranchised those who advocated repeal "to prevent persons from 
being enabled by their votes to defeat the criminal laws of the country." ... Today, presumably those who support the 
legalization of marihuana could be barred from the ballot box for the same reason. The ballot is the democratic system's 
coin of the realm. To condition its exercise on support of the established order is to debase that currency beyond 
recognition. n141 
  
 The idea of content-neutrality in allocating the franchise was affirmed by the Court in Carrington v. Rash n142 where it 
struck down as unconstitutional a Texas law barring military personnel from voting in local elections because of an 
alleged incompatibility of views between military and civilian residents. The Court held that it is unconstitutional for a 
state to "fence out" a particular class of voters because of suspicions about the way they might vote. n143 
A liberal democratic political system functions best when the views and preferences of all its members can be 
expressed through the franchise. n144 When the views of one group are systematically cut out of the political process, 
the public debate will be skewed, particularly if the views of members of the excluded group do not reflect the 
distribution of views in the rest of the population. The disenfranchisement of prisoners removes from the criminal 
policy debate the electoral influence of individuals who have personal experience with the application of that law, and 
who arguably have much to contribute to that debate. n145 For example, one might reasonably suspect that prisoners 
could have different views about extremely punitive criminal laws such as "Three Strikes" policies. Of course, any 
differences that exist might not be enough to tip the scales in an election, n146 but if the distribution of views about 
such policies is different among  [*96]  prisoners than in the general population, it could be a significant factor in some 
elections or referenda. 
Similarly, opponents of increasingly strict sentencing laws for certain drug offences often argue that such laws are 
political, pointing to the reality that African Americans are convicted and sentenced under such laws at a rate 
disproportionate to their share of the population. n147 Since many African Americans are locked up under those very 
laws (or disenfranchised as ex-felons), they cannot contribute to the efforts to change the laws. It is left largely in the 
hands of people in the jurisdiction who have never experienced the impact of the laws to effect legislative change. If 
drug laws are at least partially political and the product of a certain social climate, then it seems appropriate that 
individuals with experience under those laws not be barred from making and altering them. 
It might be objected that prisoners have too large a stake in the criminal justice system to be neutral about the 
issues. However, it is the government that must be neutral about the content of its citizens' votes, not the voters 
themselves that must be neutral about the issues: 
  
Bias does not disqualify people from voting. Indeed voting is precisely about expressing biases, loyalties, commitments, 
and personal values. Excluding from the electorate those who have felt the sting of the criminal law obviously skews the 
politics of criminal justice toward one side of the debate. n148 
  
 One might also question the empirical basis for suggesting that the distribution of views and preferences among 
prisoners will not track the distribution of views and preferences in the relevant political community in which they 
would vote. n149  [*97]  Not surprisingly given their lack of political participation, there appears to have been no 
 scientific study of prisoner political views in the United States. However, we do know something about the 
demographics of the prison population that may help us understand the political impact of disenfranchising prisoners. 
n150 
C. The Instrumental Effect in Racialized Communities 
  
 One cannot talk about voting rights or prisoners' rights in the United States without talking about race. It is no secret 
that the population of inmates does not reflect the racial composition of the United States as a whole. Rather, it consists 
of disproportionately large numbers of African American and Hispanic people. Forty-five percent of prison inmates are 
African American and eighteen percent are Hispanic, compared to 12.3% and 12.5% of the general population 
respectively. n151 Similarly, while one in sixty-three White males aged twenty-five to twenty-nine was in prison or jail 
in 2001, the number is one in eight for African American men and one in twenty-three for Hispanic men. n152 
The phenomenon of racial bloc voting in the United States is also well-documented, particularly in the South. n153 
The fact that a majority of African Americans vote for Democratic candidates is also well-known. n154 Pamela Karlan  
[*98]  further notes that African Americans tend to be quite politically cohesive: 
  
[African Americans] occupy a position similar to that of many other socially and politically cohesive groups, such as 
"union-oriented workers, the university community, [and] religious or ethnic groups occupying identifiable areas of our 
heterogeneous cities and urban areas." To the extent that racially homogeneous social groups share political preferences, 
a pluralistic political system that seeks to aggregate exogenous preferences cannot categorically exclude such groups 
without sacrificing legitimacy. n155 
  
 On an issue such as affirmative action, African Americans tend to have different views than "White Americans," n156 
a fact which may well translate into policy preferences in voting. There is also some indication that African Americans 
may have different opinions and views with respect to policing than White Americans. n157 While a majority of the 
Supreme Court has actively resisted, as a normative matter, the notion that African American voters have a distinct 
political viewpoint, n158 evidence points to a contrary reality, at least with respect to support for the major political 
parties. 
If the content of African American votes is different from that of the wider population, or if the success of African 
American candidates is dependant on the existence of an African American majority in a given district, the fact that 
members of this group are disenfranchised in numbers disproportionate to their share of the population has serious 
implications for the political process. n159 
 [*99]  The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People [NAACP] appears to have recently 
considered the potential impact that prisoners' votes might have in an election. As part of its 2000 drive to register as 
many as four million new voters, the NAACP made efforts to register prisoners convicted of misdemeanours or 
awaiting trial since state laws often disenfranchise only those convicted of felony offences. n160 The drive was aimed at 
states such as North Carolina in which African Americans comprise approximately half of those convicted of 
misdemeanours and nearly two-thirds of those convicted of felonies, while representing only twenty-two percent of the 
state's population. n161 
Finally, an inmate in a New York state prison made an instrumental argument for prisoner voting rights in a letter 
to the editor of the New York Daily News in 1993 by highlighting his perception of the negative effect of 
disenfranchisement on minority communities' political power: 
  
We believe that the law that takes away a prisoner's right to vote has a crippling effect on so-called minority 
communities' attempts at political empowerment... . So-called minorities are more likely than whites to be incarcerated 
when convicted of the same crimes... . Allowing prisoners to vote would be a plus for black and Hispanic ambitions - 
and maybe that is why it is not allowed. n162 
  
D. Prisoners as Voters and Constituents: Making Politicians Accountable 
  
 Even if the distribution of views and preferences of the prison population accurately reflects those of the non-
incarcerated population, and even in the absence of proven race discrimination, n163 there may be other salutary effects 
on the  [*100]  political process if prisoners are included in the electorate. 
 Currently, there is little need for politicians to pay attention to criminal justice matters beyond being sensitive to 
their constituents' concerns about controlling the crime that they perceive as increasing. n164 The conditions of prisons 
and the effect of harsh sentencing laws on prisoners rarely figure in their strategic calculus. n165 Prisoners are no 
politician's constituents. n166 In the current climate, there is little to gain, and much to lose, if a politician is seen as 
being soft on crime. n167 While extending the franchise to prisoners would not likely alter that equation radically, there 
is reason to believe that some politicians would take seriously their responsibility to visit their constituents in prison, to 
educate themselves about the issues that face prisoners, and perhaps to take an interest in less punitive criminal law 
reform. n168 
In the Canadian province of Quebec, where provincial law permits all prisoners to vote, anecdotal evidence 
indicates that at least some candidates have  [*101]  taken an interest in the prison vote. During the 1998 provincial 
election campaign, Parti Quebecois candidate Raoul Duguay visited Cowansville Penitentiary, a federal prison which 
houses many long-term inmates. n169 Under Quebec law which provides that inmates' votes are counted in their place 
of domicile, n170 ninety-two inmates had designated the prison as their place of domicile. For Duguay, who was 
running in that district, those ninety-two votes were significant enough to warrant meeting with inmates to discuss their 
concerns. n171 The potential for this kind of interaction between prisoners and current or aspiring politicians raises 
other issues that trouble opponents of prisoner enfranchisement, including the location where prisoners votes will be 
counted and the potential security and administrative concerns associated with facilitating inmates' access to politicians 
and to political information. These issues will be addressed below. 
VI. 
  
"Getting Out the (Prison) Vote": Implementing Prisoner Voting Rights 
  
 A theme in the debate over prisoner voting rights in Canada is how to administer and facilitate prison votes so that the 
franchise might have some instrumental effect. Even where prisoners are permitted by law to vote, voter turnout 
remains low, as it is in those U.S. states allowing some prisoners to vote. For example, Canada's Chief Electoral Officer 
reports that only 5,194 (or 22.5%) of the 23,116 incarcerated persons in Canada who were eligible to vote in the 
November 2000 federal election, n172 actually cast ballots. In the Canadian province of Ontario, only 28.9% of eligible 
inmates cast ballots in the 1992 national constitutional referendum, compared with a turnout of seventy-two percent 
across the province. n173 In Utah, where prisoners were permitted to vote until the state constitution was amended in 
1998, n174 only ninety-five voters registered in Salt Lake County in 1996 and voter turnout by eligible inmates was 
estimated at five percent. n175 A notable exception is the Canadian province of Quebec where voting by prisoners in 
three elections in the early 1990s reached seventy-four percent. n176 
 [*102]  In part, the low numbers might be seen as simply an exaggerated reflection of declining voter turnout 
trends in the larger electorate in countries such as the United States n177 and Canada, n178 but that is not the only 
explanation. In many jurisdictions, neither prison nor election officials take any action to facilitate prisoner voting. n179 
Some citizen groups in the United States have attempted to fill this void. n180 However, without the involvement and 
cooperation of public officials, the right to vote will remain illusory for many prisoners. In 1999, South African 
government officials heard from their Constitutional Court that the "right to vote by its very nature imposes positive 
obligations upon the legislature and the executive." n181 To make the right a reality, the government was ordered to 
fulfil its corresponding duty to take all necessary measures to facilitate prisoner voting. 
A. Where Should Prisoners Vote? 
  
 Whether prisoners' votes should be counted in their place of pre-incarceration residence or in the location of the prison 
is an important aspect of the debate over prisoner enfranchisement. n182 It is significant because opponents of prisoner 
enfranchisement cite the potential for large numbers of prisoners to swamp local voters in rural areas if prisoners are 
permitted to vote in the prison district. n183  [*103]  Prisoners also might want to have their votes counted in their 
home districts if they have children and other family members with interests in schools, taxes, housing, and other local 
government programs. Long-term prisoners, on the other hand, often have little or no connection to their place of pre-
incarceration residence and may intend to settle in the vicinity of the prison following release. n184 Some proposals for 
addressing these concerns are discussed below. 
1. The "Ordinary Residence" Test 
  
  The law in most jurisdictions provides that eligible voters may vote only in the place where they are "ordinarily 
resident." n185 Over the years, disputes have arisen over whether prisoners are "ordinarily resident" or have acquired a 
"domicile" in the prison when the legislation does not expressly deem them to be resident elsewhere. For example, in 
Dane v. Board of Registrar of Voters of Concord n186 a Massachusetts court was called on to decide the ordinary 
residence of approximately three hundred inmates living in a prison in Concord, Massachusetts who attempted to 
register to vote in Concord. n187 In allowing the prisoners to  [*104]  register on the rolls in Concord, the Registrar of 
Voters apparently relied on a memorandum from the Deputy State Secretary and Director of Elections which said, 
"prisoners may register to vote in the community in which the prison is located if they swear in the affidavit of 
registration that they consider that residence to be their home." n188 This memorandum was meant to amplify the 
legislation which provided that individuals who otherwise qualified to vote and who "shall have resided within the town 
or district in which [they] may claim a right to vote, six calendar months preceding any election" were eligible to vote in 
that district. n189 
The court reviewed precedents from Massachusetts and from other states which indicated that, as a general rule, 
individuals who are involuntarily resident in a particular location do not acquire a new domicile there. n190 However, 
the court also noted that military personnel are permitted to show a change of domicile even though the move is 
involuntary. n191 The court ultimately concluded that a person's involuntary residence in a particular place raises a 
rebuttable presumption that the person retained his or her former domicile. n192 That presumption can be rebutted by 
evidence presented by a prisoner in an affidavit of registration about the intention to make the prison location the 
person's home. n193 The Register of Voters can then question the individual generally on the location of bank accounts, 
past voter registrations, payment of taxes, and "other facts evidencing their attachment to the community" and can 
conclude that he or she had not successfully acquired a new domicile of choice. n194 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to canvas all the ways that different jurisdictions define "ordinary residence" or 
domicile for voting purposes, or to come up with a definitive approach to domicile that best balances the competing 
interests associated with voting by prisoners. However, a few options come to mind. One approach might be to establish 
a default rule that prisoners retain their pre-incarceration domicile unless they have been incarcerated for at least five 
consecutive years, n195 in which case they could elect to acquire a new domicile in the  [*105]  prison. n196 If they do 
not elect, they would retain their prior domicile. An alternative would be to employ a rebuttable presumption like the 
one adopted in Dane. However, this sort of rule would likely require more administration and entail more discretion, 
leading to uneven results. A further alternative would be simply to deem prisoners to be domiciled in the prison. n197 
The appeal of a threshold based on length of time in prison is that it offers consistency and predictability, is easier to 
administer, and addresses some of the problems associated with allocating all prisoners to either their "home" district or 
the prison district. Whatever the chosen method, it seems just that at least some long-term inmates be permitted to 
register and vote in the prison's electoral district. n198 
2. Prisoners Housed Out-of-State 
  
 An additional problem associated with deeming all prisoners to be residents of their pre-incarceration address arises 
from the fact that states increasingly contract with each other to house prisoners from out-of-state. Therefore, prisoners 
from, for example, Michigan, would be eligible to vote in a Michigan election (since Michigan was their place of 
ordinary residence), yet they may be housed in a prison in Ohio and may have to enlist the Ohio prison officials to assist 
them in registering to vote in Michigan. Otherwise, if postal voting was available, prisoners could write directly to the 
election officials in Michigan for voting materials. n199 However, with respect to state and local elections, it is possible 
that such out-of-state prisoners may be unaware that an election campaign has begun in the home state. If inmates were 
considered residents in the district (and state) in which they were incarcerated, their voting could be more easily 
facilitated by officials in that state. Since these transfers appear to be made for administrative convenience and cost-
effectiveness, and if prisoners are otherwise considered eligible to vote, it seems perverse to deny them that opportunity 
simply because the state has entered into such a transfer of services agreement. A possible solution would be to deem all 
out-of-state prisoners to be residents of the state in which they are incarcerated at the time of registration, a result in 
keeping with census data. 
3. Prisoner Residence for Census Purposes 
  
 In assessing the propriety of designating prisoners as residents of their pre-incarceration place of residence, it is useful 
to inquire into the way their residence is determined for other purposes, such as the national census. In fact, the census  
[*106]  counts inmates as residents of the town or city in which the prison is located. n200 This determination carries 
 substantial financial consequences for both the "host" and the "home" district of the inmate because federal grant 
funding is distributed on a per capita basis according to the median income of the various municipalities seeking 
funding. For example, the population of the town of Coxsackie in rural upstate New York includes 2,100 prisoners 
living in two prisons (forming 27.5% of the town's population), the majority of whom earn little if any money, a fact 
which substantially drives down the median income in Coxsackie. n201 In the 1990s, Coxsackie received several grants 
from the Department of Housing and Urban Development of up to $ 600,000 each, due in part to the town's prison 
population. n202 This money did not go to the largely impoverished urban communities from which the majority of 
Coxsackie's inmates come. 
Similarly, electoral boundaries are drawn according to census figures. n203 Prisoners inflate the population of the 
host community, but are not allowed to vote. n204 Therefore, in a state like New York, a combination of census rules, 
incarceration patterns, and voting laws increases the voting strength of largely White, rural voters, while diluting the 
voting power of African American and Latino urban voters. n205 
The relationship of census data to federal funding and electoral boundaries is a controversial and changing area of 
contemporary research. This paper does not seek to weigh into that debate other than to note that the non-prisoner 
residents of prison towns appear to benefit in a number of ways from the existence of prisoners in their midst. The 
preferred methods of counting prisoners for census purposes and for voting purposes are at odds and therefore the 
appropriate policy for allocating prisoners' votes should be considered alongside these other policies. For example, if the 
franchise was extended to prisoners and concerns about their votes  [*107]  swamping those of the rural prison district 
were persuasive, n206 then their votes might appropriately be counted in their home urban districts. However, if such a 
policy was adopted, the census data should also be adjusted to include those "absentee" voter/residents in the urban 
districts for purposes of determining electoral districts and federal funding. 
B. The Mechanics of Voting: Polling Stations, Proxies, or Postal Votes 
  
 Options available for voting by prisoners include polling stations set up in prisons either on the day of the election (if 
prisoners vote in the prison constituency) or approximately ten days in advance of the election, n207 voting by proxy 
through a relative or close friend in the home constituency, or absentee voting with the use of postal ballots. After 
considering the benefits and disadvantages of all three of these options, researchers for both the Australian Law Reform 
Commission and the Canadian Royal Commission on Electoral Reform favoured voting at polling stations within 
prisons. n208 The Australian researchers found that, 
  
The presence of a polling booth in the gaol increases the likelihood of elector participation and enables prisoners to feel 
more a part of the electoral process. It also removes the possibility of any allegations (however unjustified) of 
interference by prison authorities with postal votes. n209 
  
 A problem associated with proxy ballots is the fact that some prisoners do not have a close friend or relative living in 
the district in which the prisoner is eligible to vote. n210 Consequently, that option was not advocated in the Canadian 
and Australian reports. The Canadian researchers admit that establishing polling places in prisons is the most 
administratively complex procedure for electoral officers and prison officials. n211 However, they conclude that it is 
the only way to encourage and facilitate substantial voter turnout. n212 Given the current low turnout by eligible 
prisoner voters in the United States, such measures could have significant impact. 
C. Ancillary Rights Associated with Voting by Prisoners 
  
 A different sort of objection to prisoner voting rights is found in the notion that prisoners cannot exercise a free and 
informed vote by virtue of their  [*108]  incarceration. In the first action brought by Richard Sauve to federal prisoner 
disenfranchisement in Canada, the government sought to defend the law in part on the basis "that the integrity of the 
voting process requires participation in, or at least exposure to, the interplay of ideas which exist in society at large" and 
that "the conditions that prevail in penal institutions are inimical to public discussion and debate." n213 Canadian courts 
have held that existing limits on prisoners' access to political campaign material, candidates, and other information 
relevant to elections do not justify disenfranchisement. n214 In Belczowski v. Canada, n215 for example, Justice 
Strayer stated that being informed about the particular issues in a campaign is not a prerequisite to exercising the 
franchise. n216 In another case, Justice Arbour took note of the fact that the vast majority of federal and provincial 
prisoners in Canada have at least some access to newspaper and television, including cable television which provides 
coverage of Parliamentary debates. n217 She further noted that many Canadians "have chosen to live in a universe 
 figuratively not much larger than a prison cell" and that for most people, the media is their primary means of accessing 
information about politics. n218 
While Canadian and American law respecting prisoners' constitutional rights and judicial review of prison 
conditions differ, n219 it appears that most prisoners in the United States have at least limited access to radio or 
television, n220 although  [*109]  there is no right to have any particular level of access to the media. Under the 
minimal level of scrutiny applied to prison administrative decisions, courts would likely uphold restrictions (or even 
outright prohibitions) on the ability of prisoners to meet to discuss politics if they were convinced that legitimate 
security interests were raised by such meetings. n221 U.S. courts are highly deferential to the judgment of prison 
officials in this regard. Prison rules prohibiting prisoners from holding union meetings, prohibiting inmate solicitation 
of other inmates to join the union, and banning mailings concerning the union from outside sources were upheld by the 
Supreme Court as reasonable responses to legitimate security concerns. n222 
Following the Canadian approach, the fact of limited access to news media, campaign materials and candidates 
should not be seen as a justification to disenfranchise prisoners. However, it is appropriate to inquire into the minimal 
level of access to political information and communication that should be available to prisoners in order to facilitate 
meaningful access to the ballot box. 
Election and prison officials in other jurisdictions have taken concrete steps to educate prisoners about their voting 
rights and to facilitate the exercise of those rights. In Canada, a Royal Commission on Electoral Reform heard detailed 
testimony about the procedures that were adopted by Quebec election and prison officials to disseminate voting 
information to prisoners and to regulate the voting process. n223 These officials had cooperated to produce a forty-two 
page manual for inmate voting that included provisions for disseminating publications from political parties, as well as 
registration and voting details. They reported that the only contentious issue was whether to permit candidates access to 
penal institutions. Since publication of the Royal Commission's report, Quebec now permits candidates to meet with 
inmates when advance notice is given. n224 The Commission researchers concluded that elected representatives had 
met with prison inmates on a number of occasions and that it was likely that security concerns associated with candidate 
visits could be addressed with advance notice and planning. They concluded, however, that such meetings "are not 
absolutely necessary to ensure that the inmates are well informed and able to exercise their voting rights in a 
knowledgeable manner - few Canadian voters actually meet candidates." n225 
In short, while liberal access to candidates, media, fora for discussion, and written information about candidates and 
policies would likely encourage more prisoners to vote, only a minimal level of access to information is truly necessary  
[*110]  for prisoners to exercise that right. The experience in other jurisdictions reveals that when measures are taken to 
educate prisoners about their rights, to disseminate information to them, to operate polls in prisons, or to assist prisoners 
with postal ballots, voter turnout by prisoners will rise. n226 
VII. Conclusion 
  
 On one level, voting is a symbolic, expressive act that demonstrates membership in a community. On another, it is the 
centrepiece of the democratic political process and the primary way in which citizens participate in changing the 
governing rules of that community. The loss of voting rights means the loss of both of these functions. For some 
prisoners, the loss is keenly felt. n227 For prisoners who come from socially and economically disadvantaged 
communities and who may not have participated in the electoral system in great numbers on the outside, the lack of 
voting rights may feel like no great loss. However, the effect of disenfranchising prisoners is felt not just by the few 
prisoners who seek out the opportunity to vote and are told they are unfit for the franchise. It touches all of us by 
altering the composition of the electorate in ways that may have an effect on the formation of public policy, and by 
perpetuating the symbolic and instrumental exclusion of millions of already marginalized members of society. 
The repeal of prisoner disenfranchisement laws may seem like a quaint, naive notion with little hope of success in 
an age when politicians compete for the badge of being "tough on crime." Furthermore, even if enfranchisement is 
possible, it may be like putting a band-aid on a gaping wound of injustice, both in the criminal law and for the plight of 
the disadvantaged groups whose members largely make up the prison population. n228 
If the thought of treating the prisoners in many of this country's most punitive prisons n229 as citizen-voters with 
legitimate interests in governance and a right to  [*111]  express their views through the ballot box seems difficult to 
accomplish and incongruous with the current approach to prisoners, perhaps we should ask why. Might the difficulties 
associated with imagining and implementing prisoner voting prompt us to re-think our approach to corrections and to 
 the treatment of prisoners more generally? n230 Can the United States learn something from jurisdictions such as 
Canada with similar legal systems where the idea of prisoners voting has become a reality? 
The repeal of prisoner disenfranchisement law will not be the solution to these larger problems, nor will it 
necessarily affect prisoners' day-to-day lives appreciably. However, our society's professed commitment to liberal 
democratic principles requires that we repeal the laws that treat prisoners as "temporary outcasts from our system of 
rights and democracy." n231 
 
FOOTNOTES: 
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